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Cognitive design, as the design of cognitive work and cognitive tools, is 
predominantly a craft practice which currently depends on the experience and 
insight of the designer. However the emergence of a discipline of Cognitive 
Engineering promises a more effective alternative practice, one which turns on the 
prescription of solutions to cognitive design problems. In this paper, we first 
examine the requirements for advancing Cognitive Engineering as a discipline. In 
particular, we identify the need for a conception which would provide the concepts 
necessary for explicitly formulating cognitive design problems. A proposal for such 
a conception is then presented.  
1. Discipline of Cognitive Engineering 
1.1.  Evolution of Cognitive Design 
A recurrent assumption about technological progress is that it derives from, or is 
propelled by, the application of scientific theory. Design is seen principally as an 
activity which translates scientific theory into useful artifacts. As such, design does 
not possess its own knowledge, other than perhaps as the derivative of a purer 
scientific knowledge. Yet close examination (Layton, 1974; Vincenti, 1993) shows this 
view to be in contradiction of the facts. The more correct analysis suggests that 
technology disciplines acquire and develop their own knowledge which enables 
them to solve their design problems (Long and Dowell, 1996).  
The analysis of "technology as knowledge" (Layton, 1974) recognises the variety of 
forms of technological knowledge, ranging from tacit 'know how' and 'know what', 
based on personal experience, to validated engineering principles. Consider the 
evolution of a new technology. New technologies invariably emerge from the 
“inspired tinkering” (Landes, 1969) of a few who see a direct route between 
innovation and exploitation. As an industry is established, ad hoc  innovation is 
supplanted by more methodical practices through which the experience of prior 
problems is codified and re-used. Design is institutionalised as a craft discipline 
which supports the cumulation and sharing of techniques and lessons learnt. The 
knowledge accumulated is only marginally, or indirectly derivative of scientific      




theory. In the case of computing technology, for example, Shaw has observed: " 
Computer science has contributed some relevant theory but practice proceeds 
largely independently of this organised knowledge (Shaw, 1990)". 
This same observation can be made of cognitive design, the activity of designing 
cognitive work and cognitive tools (including interactive computational tools). To 
date, the seminal successes in cognitive design have been principally the result of 
inspired innovation. The graphical user interface arose from the careful application 
of experience cast as design heuristics, for example, “Communicate through 
metaphors” (Johnson, Roberts, Verplank, Irby, Beard and Mackey, 1989). The 
spreadsheet is another example. More recent advances in "cognitive technologies", 
such as those in groupware, dynamic visualisation techniques, and multimedia, are 
no different in arising essentially through craft practice based on innovation, 
experience and prior developments. Nevertheless, in the wake of these advances, a 
craft discipline has been established which supports the cumulation and sharing of 
knowledge of cognitive design. 
However the history of technological disciplines also indicates that continued 
progress depends on the evolution of a corpus of validated theory to support them 
(Hoare, 1981; Shaw, 1990). Craft disciplines give way to engineering disciplines: 
personal experiential knowledge is replaced by design principles; 'invent and test' 
practices (that is to say, trial-and-error) are replaced by 'specify then implement' 
practices. Critically, design principles appear not to be acquired by translation of 
scientific theories. Rather, they are developed through the validation of knowledge 
about design problems and how to solve them. 
The evolution of an engineering discipline is a visible requirement for progress in 
cognitive design. The requirement is apparent in at least three respects. First,  
cognitive design needs to improve its integration in systems development practices, 
and to ensure it has a greater influence in the early development life of products. 
Second, cognitive design needs to improve the reliability of its contributions to 
design, providing a greater assurance of the effectiveness of cognitive work and 
tools. Third, cognitive design needs to improve its learning process so that 
knowledge accumulated in successful designs  can be made available to support 
solutions to new design problems. For at least these reasons, cognitive design must 
advance towards an engineering discipline. This paper is addressed to the evolution 
of such a discipline, a discipline of Cognitive Engineering.  
1.2.  Emergence of Cognitive Engineering 
The idea of a discipline of Cognitive Engineering has been advocated consistently 
for more than a decade (Hollnagel and Woods, 1983; Norman, 1986; Rasmussen, 
Pejtersen, and Goodstein, 1994; Woods, 1994). Norman has described Cognitive 
Engineering as a discipline which has yet to be constructed but whose promise is to 
transform cognitive design by supplying the "principles that get the design to a 
pretty good state the first time around (Norman, 1986)". The aims of Cognitive 
Engineering are "to understand the fundamental principles behind human action 
and performance that are relevant for the development of engineering principles of 
design", and second, "to devise systems that are pleasant to use". The critical 
phenomena of Cognitive Engineering include tasks, user action, user conceptual 
models and system image. The critical methods of Cognitive Engineering include 
approximation, and treating design as a series of trade-offs including giving 
different priorities to design decisions (Norman, 1986).       




Woods (1994) describes Cognitive Engineering as an approach to the interaction 
and cooperation of people and technology. Significantly, it is not to be taken as an 
applied Cognitive Science, seeking to apply computational theories of mind to the 
design of systems of cognitive work. Rather, Cognitive Engineering is challenged to 
develop its own theoretical base. Further, "Cognitive systems are distributed over 
multiple agents, both people and machines" (Woods, 1994) which cooperatively 
perform cognitive work. Hence the unit of analysis must be the joint and distributed 
cognitive system. The question which Cognitive Engineering addresses is how to 
maximise the overall performance of this joint system. Woods and Roth (1988) state 
that this question is not answered simply through amassing ever more powerful 
technology; they contrast such a technology-driven approach with a problem-driven 
approach wherein the "requirements and bottlenecks in cognitive task performance 
drive the development of tools to support the human problem solver". Yet whether 
such an approach may be developed remains an open question: whether designers 
might be provided with the "concepts and techniques to determine what will be 
useful, or are we condemned to simply build what can be practically built and wait 
for the judgement of experience?" Woods and Roth re-state this as ultimately a 
question of whether "principle-driven design is possible". 
1.3.  Discipline matrix of Cognitive Engineering 
Cognitive Engineering is clearly an emerging discipline whose nucleus has been in 
research aiming to support cognitive design. The breadth and variety of its activity 
has continued to grow from its inception and the question now arises as to how the 
evolution of this discipline can be channelled and hastened. It is here that reference 
to Kuhn's analysis of paradigms in the (physical and biological) sciences may offer 
guidance (Kuhn, 1970). Specifically, Kuhn identifies the principal elements of a 
'discipline matrix' by which a discipline emerges and evolves. We might similarly 
interpret the necessary elements of the 'discipline matrix' of Cognitive Engineering.  
The first element described by Kuhn is a "shared commitment to models" which 
enables a discipline to recognise its scope, or ontology. (Kuhn gives the example of a 
commitment to the model of heat conceived as the kinetic energy of the constituent 
parts of masses). For Cognitive Engineering, we may interpret this requirement as 
the need to acquire a conception of the nature and scope of cognitive design 
problems. Similarly, as Carroll and Campbell have argued,  "the appropriate 
ontology, the right problems and the right ways of looking at them ... have to be in 
place for hard science to develop (Carroll and Campbell, 1986)”. Features of a 
conception for Cognitive Engineering are already apparent, for example, in Wood's 
assertion that the unit of analysis must be the distributed cognitive system 
A second element of the disciplinary matrix is "values" which guide the solution to 
problems. Kuhn gives the example of the importance which science attaches to 
prediction. Cognitive Engineering also needs to establish its values, an example is 
the value attached to design prescription: "(getting) the design to a pretty good state 
the first time around (Norman, 1986)" 
A third element is "symbolic generalisations" which function both as laws and 
definitions for solving problems. Kuhn gives the example of Ohm's Law which 
specifies the lawful relationships between the concepts of resistance, current and 
voltage. For Cognitive Engineering, we may interpret this requirement as the need 
for engineering principles which express the relations between concepts and which 
enable design prescription. The need for engineering principles is one which has 
been recognised by both Norman and by Woods.       




The final element of the disciplinary matrix is "exemplars" which are instances of 
problems and their solutions. Exemplars work by exemplifying the use of models, 
values and symbolic generalisations, and they support reasoning about similarity 
relations with new and unsolved problems. Kuhn gives the example of the 
application of Newton's second law to predicting the motion of the simple 
pendulum. (Note, Newton's second law embodies the concept of inertia established 
in the model of mechanics which commences the Principia). Cognitive Engineering 
too must acquire exemplars, but here those exemplars are instances of solutions to 
cognitive design problems, together with the design practices which produced those 
solutions. Such design exemplars must illustrate the application of the conception, 
values and design principles and must allow designers to view new cognitive design 
problems as similar to problems already solved.  
1.4.   Requirements for a conception 
If this analysis of the discipline matrix of Cognitive Engineering is correct, then it is 
also apparent that the necessary elements substantially remain to be constructed. 
None are particularly apparent in the craft-like discipline of Human Factors which, 
for example, does not possess engineering principles, the heuristics it possesses 
being either 'rules of thumb' derived from experience or guidelines derived 
informally from psychological theories and findings.  
This paper is concerned with the requirement for a conception of cognitive design. 
As later explained, we believe this is the element of the Cognitive Engineering 
matrix which can and should be established first. The current absence of a 
conception of cognitive design is well recognised; for example, Barnard and 
Harrison (1989) called for an "integrating framework .... that situates action in the 
context of work .... and relates system states to cognitive states", a call which still 
remains unanswered. However it would be wrong to suggest that currently there is 
no available conception of cognitive design. Rather, there are many alternative and 
conflicting conceptions, most being informal and partial. Hollnagel (1991) was able 
to characterise three broad kinds of conception: the computer as 'interlocutor', with 
cognitive work seen as a form of conversation with cognitive tools; the "human 
centred" conception, wherein cognitive work is understood in terms of the user's 
experience of the world and its mediation by tools; and the 'systems understanding' 
in which the worker and tools constitute a socio-technical system acting in a world. 
The last form of conception most clearly conforms with Woods' requirements for 
Cognitive Engineering, as detailed above.  
Previously we have proposed a conception of the cognitive design problem 
(Dowell and Long, 1989; see also, Long and Dowell, 1989) intended to contribute to 
the discipline matrix of Cognitive Engineering. That proposal is re-stated in revised 
form below. 
2  Conception of the Cognitive Engineering design 
problem 
Cognitive design concerns the problems of designing effective cognitive work, and 
the tools with which we perform that work. Our conception of the general problem 
of Cognitive Engineering is formulated over concepts of cognitive work and tools, 
and the need to prescribe effective solutions to the cognitive design problems they      




present. The concepts are highlighted on first reference. A glossary appears at the 
end of the paper. 
Cognitive work is performed by worksystems which use knowledge to produce 
intended changes in environments, or domains.Worksystems consist of both human 
activity and the tools which are used in that activity (Mumford, 1995). Domains are 
organised around specific goals and contain both possibilities and constraints. For 
example, the domain of Air Traffic Management is defined by the goals of getting 
aircraft to their  destinations safely, on time, and with a minimum of fuel use, etc. 
This domain has possibilities, such as vacant flight levels and the climbing abilities 
of different aircraft; it also has constraints, such as rules about the legal separation of 
aircraft. Cognitive work occurs when a particular worksystem uses knowledge to 
intentionally realise the possibilities in a particular domain to achieve goals. The air 
traffic controllers, for example, use their knowledge of individual flights, and of 
standard routes through some airspace, to instruct aircraft to maintain separations 
and best flight tracks. In this way, the controllers act intentionally to provide a 
desired level of safety and 'expedition' to all air traffic. 
Cognitive tools support the use of knowledge in cognitive work. Those tools 
provide representations of domains, processes for transforming those 
representations, and a means of expressing those transformations in the domains 
(Simon, 1969). The radar and other devices in the Air Traffic Controller's suite, for 
example, provide representations which enable the controller to reason about the 
state of the domain, such as aircraft proximities, and to transform those 
representations, including issuing instructions to pilots, so expressing the 
controller's activity in the air traffic management domain. The controller's tools 
embed the intention of their designers of helping the controller achieve their goals. 
In spite of the way we may often casually describe what we are doing, it is never the 
case that the our real intention is one of using a tool. Rather, our intention is to do 
‘something’ with the tool. The difficulty we have, in describing exactly what that 
something is, stems from the fact that the domains in which we perform cognitive 
work are often virtual worlds, far removed from physical objects (for instance, 
computer-mediated foreign exchange dealing).  
 The worksystem clearly forms a dualism with its domain: it therefore makes no 
sense to consider one in isolation of the other (Neisser, 1987). If the worksystem is 
well adapted to its domain, it will reflect the goals, regularities and complexities in 
the domain (Simon, 1969). It follows that the fundamental unit of analysis in 
cognitive design must be the worksystem whose agents are joined by the common 
intention of performing work in the domain (see also Rasmussen and Vicente, 1990; 
Woods, 1994). Within the worksystem, human activity is said to be intentional, the 
behaviour of tools is said to be intended.  
The following sections outline a conception of cognitive work informed by systems 
design theory (e.g., Simon, 1969; Checkland, 1981), ecological systems theory (e.g., 
Neisser, 1987), cognitive science (e.g., Winograd and Flores, 1986) and Cognitive 
Engineering theory (e.g., Woods, 1994). It provides a related set of concepts of the 
worksystem as a system of human and device agents which use knowledge to 
perform work in a domain.  
2.1  Domains of cognitive work  
The domains of cognitive work are abstractions of the 'real world' which describe 
the goals, possibilities and constraints of the environment of the worksystem. 
Beltracchi (1987, see Rasmussen and Vicente (1990)), for example, used the Rankine      




Cycle to describe the environment of process controllers. However, for most 
domains, such formal models and theories are not available, even for ubiquitous 
domains such as document production. Further too, such theories do not provide 
explicit or complete abstractions of the goals, possibilities and constraints for the 
decision-making worksystem. For example, the Rankine cycle leaves implicit the 
goal of optimising energy production (and the sub-goals of cycle efficiency, etc), and 
is incomplete with regard to the variables of the process (e.g., compressor pressure) 
which might be modified. The conception must therefore provide concepts for 
expressing the goals, possibilities and constraints for particular instances of domains 
of cognitive work. 
Domains can be conceptualised in terms of objects  identified by their attributes. 
Attributes emerge at different levels within a hierarchy of complexity within which 
they are related (energy cycle efficiency and feedwater temperature, for one 
example, or the safety of a set of air traffic and the separations of individual aircraft 
for another example). Attributes have states  (or values) and may exhibit the 
affordance  for change.  Desirable states of attributes we recognise as goals, for 
instance, specific separations between aircraft, and specific levels of safety of air 
traffic being managed. Work  occurs when the attribute states of objects are changed 
by the behaviours of a worksystem whose intention it is to achieve goals. However 
work does not always result in all goals being achieved all of the time, and the 
difference between the goals and the actual state changes achieved are expressed as 
task quality .  
The worksystem has a boundary  enclosing all user and device behaviours whose 
intention is to achieve the same goals in a given domain. Critically, it is only by 
defining the domain that the boundary of the worksystem can be established: users 
may exhibit many contiguous behaviours, and only by specifying the domain of 
concern, might the boundary of the worksystem enclosing all relevant behaviours be 
correctly identified. Hence, the boundary may enclose the behaviours of more than 
one device as, for example, when a user is working simultaneously with electronic 
mail and bibliographic services provided over a network. By the same token, the 
worksystem boundary may also include more than one user as, for example, in the 
case of the air traffic controller and the control chief making decisions with the same 
radar displays.  
The centrality of the task domain has not always been accepted by cognitive design 
for research, with significant theoretical consequences. Consider the GOMS model 
(Card, Moran and Newell, 1983). Within this model, goals refer to states of “the 
user’s cognitive structure” referenced to the user interface; actions (methods) are 
lower level decompositions of goals. Hence a seminal theory in cognitive design 
leaves us unable to distinguish in kind  between our goals and the behaviours by 
which we seek to achieve those goals. 
2.2   Worksystem as cognitive structures and behaviours 
Worksystems have both structures and behaviours. The structures of the 
worksystem are its component capabilities which, through coupling with the 
domain, give rise to behaviour. Behaviours  are the activation (see Just and Carpenter, 
1992; also Hoc, 1990) of structures and ultimately produce the changes in a domain 
which we recognise as work being performed.  
Consider the structures and behaviours of a text editor. A text editor is a computer 
for writing, reading and storing text. Text is a domain object  and is both real and 
virtual. At a low level of description, usually invisible to the user, text appears as      




data files stored in a distinct code. At a higher level, text consists of information and 
knowledge stored in a format which the user may choose. Text objects have 
attributes, such as character fonts at one extreme and the quality of prose at the 
other. Generally, the domain is represented by the text editor only partially and only 
at low and intermediate levels. The program is a set of structures, including 
functions, such as formatting commands, as well as menus, icons and windows. In 
simple text editors, the program is a fixed invariant structure; more sophisticated 
editors allow the user to modify the structure - users can choose which functions are 
included in the program, which are presented on the menus, and the parameters of 
the processes they specify. These structures are activated in the behaviours of the 
text editor when text is created, revised and stored. Higher level editor behaviours 
would include browsing and creating tables of contents through interaction with the 
user. With these behaviours, text which has themes, style and grammar is created by 
users.  
As this example indicates, structures consist of representations  (e.g., for storing text) 
and processes  (e.g., text editing processes). Behaviours (e.g., creating and editing text) 
are exhibited through activating structures when processes (e.g., functions) 
transform representations (e.g., text). Behaviours are the processing of 
representations. 
2.3  Cognitive structures and behaviours of the user 
Users too can be conceptualised in terms of structures and behaviours by limiting 
our concern for the person to a cognitive agent performing work. The user’s 
cognitive behaviours are the processing of representations. So, perception is a 
process where a representation of the domain, often mediated by tools, is created. 
Reasoning is a process where one representation is transformed into another 
representation. Each successive transformation is accomplished by a process that 
operates on associated representations. The user's cognitive behaviours are both 
abstract (i.e., mental) and physical. Mental behaviours include perceiving, knowing, 
reasoning and remembering; physical behaviours include looking and acting. So, the 
physical behaviour of looking might have entailed the mental behaviours of 
reasoning and remembering, that is why and where to look. These behaviours are 
related whereby mental behaviours generally determine, and are expressed by, the 
user's physical behaviours. A user similarly possesses cognitive structures, an 
architecture of processes and representations containing knowledge of the domain 
and of the worksystem, including the tools and other agents with which the user 
interacts.  
Propositions, schema, mental models and images are all proposals for the 
morphology of representations of knowledge. The organisation of the memory 
system, associative and inductive mechanisms of learning, and constraints on how 
information can be represented (such as innate grammatical principles) have all been 
proposed as aspects of cognition and its structural substrates. 
However, such theories established in Cognitive Science may not, in fact, have any 
direct relevance for the user models needed for designing cognitive work. To assume 
otherwise would be to conform with the view of (cognitive) design as an applied 
(cognitive) science, a view which we rejected at the beginning of this paper. Simply, 
the computational theory of mind is not concerned with how the symbols 
manipulated by cognition have a meaning external to the processes of manipulation, 
and therefore how they are grounded in the goals, constraints and possibilities of 
task domains (Hutchins, 1994; McShane, Dockrell and Wells, 1992). As a      




consequence, it is very likely the case that many theories presented by Cognitive 
Science to explain the manipulation of symbols cannot themselves be grounded in 
particular domains (see also Vicente,1990).  
It is rather the case that Cognitive Engineering must develop its own models of the 
user as cognitive agent. In this development, the ecology of user cognition with the 
domain must be a fundamental assumption, with models of user cognition reflecting 
the nature of the domains in which cognitive work is performed. Such an 
assumption underpins the validity of models in Cognitive Engineering: “If we do 
not have a good account of the information that perceivers are actually using, our 
hypothetical models of their information processing are almost sure to be wrong. If 
we do have such an account, however, such models may turn out to be almost 
unnecessary"(Neisser, 1987). 
2.4  Worksystem as hierarchy 
The behaviours of the worksystem emerge at hierarchical levels where each level 
subsumes the underlying levels. For example, searching a bibliographic database for 
a report subsumes formulating a database query and perhaps iteratively revising the 
query on the basis of the results obtained. These behaviours themselves subsume 
recalling features of the report being sought and interpreting the organisation of the 
database being accessed.  
The hierarchy of behaviours ultimately can be divided into abstract and physical 
levels. Abstract behaviours are generally the extraction, storage, transformation and 
communication of information. They represent and process information concerning: 
domain objects and their attributes, attribute relations and attribute states, and goals. 
Physical behaviours express abstract behaviours through action. Because they 
support behaviours at many levels, structures must also exist at commensurate 
levels.  
The hierarchy of worksystem behaviours reflects the hierarchy of complexity in the 
domain. The worksystem must therefore have behaviours at different levels of 
abstraction equivalent to the levels at which goals are identified in the domain. 
Hence a complete description of the behaviours of an authoring worksystem, for 
example, must describe not only the keystroke level behaviours relating to the goal 
of manipulating characters on a page, but it must also describe the abstract 
behaviours of composition which relate to the goals of creating prose intended to 
convey meaning. Traditional task analyses describe normative task performance in 
terms of temporal sequences of overt user behaviours. Such descriptions cannot 
capture the variability in the tasks of users who work in complex, open domains. 
Here, user behaviour will be strongly determined by the initial conditions in the 
domain and by disturbances from external sources (Vicente, 1990). In complex 
domains, the same task can be performed with the same degree of effectiveness in 
quite different ways. Traditional task analyses cannot explain the 'intelligence' in 
behaviour because they do not have recourse to a description of the abstract and 
mental behaviours which are expressed in physical behaviours.  
The hierarchy of worksystem behaviours is distributed over the agents and tools of 
the worksystem (i.e., its structures). It is definitional of systems (being 'greater than 
the sum of their parts') that they are composed from sub-systems where "the several 
components of any complex system will perform particular sub-functions that 
contribute to the overall function" (Simon, 1969). The functional relations, or "mutual 
influence" (Ashby, 1956), between the agents and between the agents and tools of the 
worksystem are interactions  between behaviours. These interactions fundamentally      




determine the overall worksystem behaviours, rather than the behaviours of 
individual agents and tools alone. The user interface  is the combination of structures 
of agents and tools supporting specific interacting behaviours (see Card, Moran and 
Newell, 1983). Norman (1986) explains that the technological structures of the user 
interfaces are changed through design, whilst the user cognitive structures of the 
user interface are changed through experience and training. 
2.5  Costs of cognitive work 
Work performed by the worksystem will always incur resource costs which may be 
structural or behavioural. Structural costs will always occur in providing the 
structures of the worksystem. Behavioural costs will always occur in using 
structures to perform work.  
Human structural costs are always incurred in learning to perform cognitive work 
and to use cognitive tools. They are the costs of developing and maintaining the 
user's knowledge and cognitive skills through education, training and gaining 
experience. The notion of learnability refers generally to the level of structural 
resource costs demanded of the user. 
Human behavioural costs are always incurred in performing cognitive work. They 
are both physical and mental. Physical costs are the costs of physical behaviours, for 
example, the costs of making keystrokes on a keyboard and scrutinising a monitor; 
they may be generally expressed as physical workload. Mental behavioural costs are 
the costs of mental behaviours, for example, the costs of knowing, reasoning, and 
deciding; they may be generally recognised as mental workload. Behavioural 
cognitive costs are evidenced in fatigue, stress and frustration. The notion of 
usability refers generally to the level of behavioural resource costs demanded of the 
user. 
2.6  Worksystem performance 
The performance  of a worksystem relates to its achievement of goals, expressed as 
task quality, and to the resource costs expended. Critically then, the behaviour of the 
worksystem is distinguished from its performance, in the same way that 'how the 
system does what it does' can be distinguished from 'how well it does it' (see also: 
Rouse, 1981; Dasgupta, 1991).  
This concept of performance ultimately supports the evaluation of worksystems. 
For example, by relating task quality to resource costs we are able to distinguish  
between two different designs of cognitive tool which, whilst enabling the same 
goals to be achieved, demand different levels of the user's resource costs. The 
different performances of the two worksystems which embody the tools would 
therefore be discriminated. Similarly, think about the implications of this concept of 
performance for concern with user error: it is not enough for user behaviours simply 
to be error-free; although eliminating errorful behaviours may contribute to the best 
performance possible, that performance may still be less than desired. On the other 
hand, although user behaviours may be errorful, a worksystem may still achieve a 
desirable performance. Optimal human behaviour uses a minimum of resource costs 
in achieving goals. However, optimality can only be determined categorically 
against worksystem performance, and the best performance of a worksystem may 
still be at variance with the performance desired of it.  
This concept of performance allows us to recognise an economics  of  performance. 
Within this economy, structural and behavioural costs may be traded-off both within      




and between the agents of the worksystem, and those costs may be traded off also 
with task quality. Users may invest structural costs in training the cognitive 
structures needed to perform a specific task, with a consequent reduction in the 
behavioural costs of performing that task. Users may expend additional behavioural 
costs in their work to compensate for the reduced structural costs invested in the 
under-development of their cognitive tools. 
The economics of worksystem performance are illustrated by Sperandio's 
observation of air traffic controllers at Orly control tower (Sperandio 1978). 
Sperandio observed that as the amount of traffic increased, the controllers would 
switch control strategies in response to increasing workload. Rather than treating 
each aircraft separately, the controllers would treat a number of following aircraft as 
a chain on a common route. This strategy would ensure that safety for each aircraft 
was still maintained, but sacrificed consideration of time keeping, fuel usage, and 
other expedition goals. This observation of the controllers' activity can be 
understood as the controller modifying their (generic) behaviours in response to the 
state of the domain as traffic increases. In effect, the controller's are trading-off their 
resource costs, that is, limiting their workload, against less critical aspects of task 
quality. The global effect of modifying their behaviour is a qualitative change in 
worksystem performance. Recent work in modelling air traffic management 
(Lemoine and Hoc, 1996) aims to dynamically re-distribute cognitive work between 
controllers and tools in order to stabilise task quality and controller resource costs, 
and therefore to stabilise worksystem performance. 
2.7  Cognitive design problems 
Engineering disciplines apply validated models and principles to prescribe 
solutions to problems of design. How then should we conceive of the design 
problems which Cognitive Engineering is expected to solve? It is commonplace for 
cognitive design to be described as a 'problem solving activity', but such descriptions 
invariably fail to say what might be the nature and form of the problem being 
solved. Where such reference is made, it is usually in domain specific terms, and a 
remarkable variety of cognitive design problems is currently presented, ranging 
from the design of teaching software for schools to the design of remote surgery. A 
recent exception can be found in Newman and Lamming (1995). Yet the ability to 
acquire knowledge which is valid from one problem to the next requires an ability to 
abstract what is general from those two problems. We presume that instances of 
cognitive design problems each embody some general form of design problem and 
further, that they are capable of explicit formulation. The following proposes that 
general form.  
Cognitive work can be conceptualised in terms of a worksystem and a domain and 
their respective concepts. In performing work, the worksystem achieves goals by 
transformations in the domain and it also incurs resources which have their cost 
(Figure 1). The aim of design is therefore 'to specify worksystems which achieve a 
desired level of performance in given domains'. 
 
More formally, we can express the general design problem of Cognitive 
Engineering as follows: 
Specify then implement the cognitive structures and behaviours of a 
worksystem {W} which performs work in a given domain (D) to a desired      




level of performance (P) in terms of task quality (ΣQ) and cognitive user 
costs (ΣKU ). 
 
 























Figure 1.  Worksystem and a domain 
 
 
An example of such a cognitive design problem formulated in these terms might 
refer to: the requirement for specifying then implementing the representations and 
processes as the knowledge of an air traffic management worksystem which is 
required to manage air traffic of a given density with a specified level of safety and 
expedition and within an acceptable level of costs to the controllers. This problem 
expression would of necessity need to be supported by related models of the air 
traffic management worksystem and domain (see Dowell, in prep). 
By its reference to design practice as 'specify then implement', this expression of 
the general cognitive design problem is equivalent to the design problems of other 
engineering disciplines; it contrasts with the trial and error practices of craft design. 
However, the relationship between the general cognitive design problem and the 
design problems addressed by other engineering disciplines associated with the 
design of cognitive tools, such as Software Engineering and 'Hardware Engineering', 
is not explicitly specified. Nevertheless, it is implied that those other engineering 
disciplines address the design of the internal behaviours and structures of cognitive 
tools embedded in the worksystem, with concern for the resource costs of those 
tools. 
3.   Prospect of Cognitive Engineering principles 
The deficiencies of current cognitive design practices have prompted our 
investigation of Cognitive Engineering as an alternative form of discipline. Our 
analysis has focused on the disciplinary matrix of Cognitive Engineering consisting 
of a conception, values, design principles and exemplars. The analysis assumes that 
Cognitive Engineering can make good 'the deficiencies'. First, the integration of 
cognitive design in systems development would be improved because Cognitive 
Engineering principles would enable the formulation of cognitive design problems 
and the early prescription of design solutions. Second, the efficacy of cognitive 
design would be improved because Cognitive Engineering principles would provide      




the guarantee so lacking in cognitive design which relies on experiential knowledge. 
Third, the efficiency of cognitive design would be improved through design 
exemplars related to principles supporting the re-use of knowledge. Fourth, the 
progress of cognitive design as a discipline would be improved through the 
cumulation of knowledge in the form of conception, design principles and 
exemplars. 
However, we observe that these elements of the disciplinary matrix required by 
Cognitive Engineering remain to be established. And since not all are likely to be 
established at the same time, the question arises as to which might be constructed 
first. A conception for Cognitive Engineering is a pre-requisite for formulating 
engineering principles. It supplies the concepts and their relations which express the 
general problem of cognitive design and which would be embodied in Cognitive 
Engineering principles.  
To this end, we have proposed a conception for Cognitive Engineering in this 
paper, one which we contend is appropriate for supporting the formulation of 
Cognitive Engineering principles. The conception for Cognitive Engineering is a 
broad view of the Cognitive Engineering general design problem. Instances of the 
general design problem may include the development of a worksystem, or the 
utilisation of a worksystem within an organisation. Developing worksystems which 
are effective, and maintaining the effectiveness of worksystems within a changing 
organisational environment, are both expressed within the problem.  
To conclude, it might be claimed that the craft nature of current cognitive design 
practices are dictated by the nature of the problem they address. In other words, the 
indeterminism and complexity of the problem of designing cognitive systems (the 
softness of the problem) might be claimed to preclude the application of prescriptive 
knowledge. We believe this claim fails to appreciate that the current absence of 
prescriptive design principles may rather be symptomatic of the early stage of the 
discipline development. The softness of the problem needs to be independently 
established. Cognitive design problems are, to some extent, hard: human behaviour 
in cognitive work is clearly to some useful degree deterministic, and sufficiently so 
for the design, to some useful degree, of interactive worksystems.  
The extent to which Cognitive Engineering principles might be realiseable in 
practice remains to be seen. It is not supposed that the development of effective 
systems will never require craft skills in some form, and engineering principles are 
not incompatible with craft knowledge. Yet the potential of Cognitive Engineering 
principles for the effectiveness of the discipline demands serious consideration. The 
conception presented in this paper  is intended to contribute towards the process of 
formulating such principles. 
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affordance - the potential change in state of a domain object 
agent - a sub-system whose behaviours are those of a single user or computer 
attribute states - the specific ‘values’ of attributes  
attributes - the ‘properties’ of domain objects 
behaviours - activities of agents and tools which we recognise as work being 
performed. 
boundary  - the extent of all user and device behaviours whose intention is to 
achieve the same goals in a given domain 
constants - attributes with states that are fixed 
domain - a task world whose possibilities and constraints are organised around 
specific goals 
 
economics of performance- the trade-off between resource costs and task quality that 
may occur both when worksystems perform work, and in design 
external behaviour - worksystem behaviour which is expressed at the worksystem 
boundary and which directly transforms domain objects 
goals - specific desirable states of attributes to be achieved 
hierarchy of complexity - the levels of agent behaviours and structures and the 
relations between them 
interaction -  the coupling of two agents 
internal behaviours - worksystem behaviours which are not expressed at the 
worksystem bounday 
objects - the elemental constituents of domains, identified by their attributes 
performance - the relationship between the task quality achieved in performing 
work and the resource costs incurred 
processes-  structures which, when activated, transform (process) information 
quality  - the extent to which goals are achieved through state changes in the 
attributes of domain objects 
representations - structures which hold information 
resource costs - the costs to agents of establishing structures and expressing 
behaviours 
structures - the components of agents and tools which give rise to their behaviour      




states  - values of the attributes of objects in a domain 
sub-systems - functional groupings of worksystem behaviours which may be 
contributed by more than one agent. 
task quality  - the difference between the goals and the actual state changes 
achieved through work 
user interface -  the combination of structures of both user and computer supporting 
their interacting behaviours 
variables - attributes with states that change 
work - intended and realised changes in the attribute states of objects 
 
worksystem - the system of agents  interacting with each other to perform work by 
intentionally changing the states of domain objects 